Taken from the perspective of computational cognitive science, and Descartes understanding of Truth, you find yourself centered on the same liar paradox as particularly interesting. Here the result is that “Any natural human language sentence can be a lie” (just as any sentence can be the truth). Here is the argument:
This is also provable based on the linguistic property of predication context. (I don’t need no logic or mathematics, just a computational understanding of neocortical computation — As Descartes emphasized “I think therefore I am.”)The fact that both logic and mathematics have these consistency properties is an epiphenomenon of a much broader class of neocortical computations associated with natural language communications reflecting how the neocortex computes on brain memories.
I studied Godel’s Proof back in 1976ish (indeed, spent an entire summer on it on the train between Rutgers where I worked and Yale where I was doing a post-doc). However, I like my poem a lot more, which I wrote in 1967 (ten years before my fun time with Godel.)
